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RIPENESS AND REVIEWABLE ORDERS
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Louis L. Jaffe*
I.

INTRODUCTION

requirement of "ripeness" as a condition for judicial review
is not so much a definable doctrine as a compendious portmanteau, a group of related doctrines arising in diverse but analogically similar situations. In its most general sense ripeness is
a requirement not of the administrative action to be reviewed but
of the judicial controversy between the plaintiff and the agency.
Consider the case where an agency has gone no further than to
threaten a certain action which the plaintiff in an equity or declaratory proceeding claims would be contrary to law: here, in all
strictness, the controversy concerns not the legality of an administrative action but the construction of a statute or of the Constitution.1 Whether such cases are "ripe" for judicial intervention
may involve not only the proper relation of agency and court but
the existence of a controversy suitable for judicial determination.
On the other hand, an agency may have taken definitive action;
it may have, for example, promulgated a regulation or issued a
complaint, served a subpoena or denied intervention. Whether
these actions can be tested forthwith raises questions which are
sometimes discussed under the rubric "ripeness," sometimes "exhaustion of remedies," 2 sometimes "standing." Discussion under
any of these rubrics may suffice, but in certain cases the issue is
faced more squarely under one than under another. In the famous Columbia Broadcasting System3 case, I would say that the
question was primarily one of "standing," since there were no
administrative remedies available to the plaintiff; it was at least
possible, though not likely, that those who could pursue such
remedies might never invoke them. In short, the question was
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• Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.-Ed.
Cf. Frankfurter, J., in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939),
referring to United States v. Los Angeles 8: S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927): "Plainly the
denial of judicial review in these cases does not derive from a regard for the special
functions of administrative agencies. Judicial abstention here is merely an application
of the traditional criteria for bringing judicial action into play." 307 U.S. at 131.
2 See Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 327
(1963).
3 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), discussed
infra. Similar is a case such as Farmer v. United Elec. Union, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1954), in which the plaintiff union might never be able to appeal.
1
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not so much whether the controversy was "ripe" but whether
there was or at any time would be a justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant.
One must also distinguish cases which involve orders which
are as "mature" as they are ever going to be; in that circumstance
the issue is whether the action is reviewable at all. Such a case is
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. 4 The function of the agency there was formally to designate organizations
as "communist." This finding, it is true, might serve later as a
predicate for further action against members of the organization,
but as far as the organization was concerned the administrative
process has reached its terminal point. Did an organization formally classified by the Government as communist, given the enormous defamatory consequences of the action, have a sufficient
interest to secure review? The affirmative answer given did not
go to the timeliness of review but to its availability vel non. On
the other hand, the so-called "directive orders" of the National
War Labor Board providing for an increase in wages were held
not reviewable because, as the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia put it, the order was "directive" rather than "mandatory." This interpretation was based on congressional intent:
Congress had rejected proposals to make the Board's orders enforceable and reviewable.5 Another case which might engage our
attention at this point is Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners
Gonference,6 a class suit by the APA section 11 trial examiners
attacking as invalid under section 11 the Civil Service Commission
regulations governing the classification, salary, assignment, promotion and lay-off of trial examiners. Part of the difficulty was that,
although these regulations were a prelude to a whole system of
future applications, in a considerable number of these applications
the affected individual would be unable to trace his predicament
precisely to the regulations. It is this kind of situation, for example, which has led some states to allow public actions to test the
validity of civil service regulations.7 There is, in short, a latent
or concealed "standing" question. Although the trial court di341 U.S. 123 (1951).
5 Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor Bd.,
143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944); accord, National War Labor
Bd. v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., 144 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774
(1944).
6 344 U.S. 853 (1952).
7 See Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1265, 1299 (1961).
4
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rected itself to the standing question, 8 it was not thereafter raised
by any of the parties and was not considered in the opinions of
either the court of appeals or the Supreme Court. The case does
illustrate, however, what will be the underlying thesis of this
article: ripeness should not be determined by formula but by a
reasoned balancing of certain typical and relevant factors for and
against the assumption of jurisdiction.
The development and expression of ripeness concepts has
become to some extent entangled with the definition of a "reviewable order." A statute may provide in particular situations for
review of an "order" or a "final order"; such review is to be had
in a named court pursuant to a specified procedure. The three
or four most discussed "ripeness" cases involved the question
whether the administrative action was an "order" under such a
statu~e. Finally, an inquiry such as this, one primarily into the
ripeness concept in administrative law, has become embroiled,
obfuscated and distorted by the acute involvement of ripeness
doctrines in constitutional adjudication.
The requirement that there be a "controversy" is applicable
generally to the exercise of the judicial function. But the criteria
for determining the existence of a controversy are flexible; the
judgments are thus ones of degree and balance. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a judge who is among those who have most insisted on the
requirement of justiciability, has said, "Whether 'justiciability'
exists . . . has most often turned on evaluating both the appropriateness of the issues for decision by courts and the hardship of
denying judicial relief." 9 This flexibility, whatever particular
judges and lawyers may think of the tactic, 10 permits courts to
insist more on the ripeness requirement in constitutional than in
other cases. It will, of course, be resorted to by judges who are
wary of exercising a court's power to adjudicate constitutional
issues. Because the Supreme Court is so predominantly concerned
with constitutional law, restrictive notions of ripeness are "in the
air" and have sometimes been applied inappropriately to administrative law questions, and also to other areas.11 State courts,
104 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1952).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951).
10 See Douglas, J., protesting against the use of "ripeness" requirements to avoid
constitutional adjudications, in Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. lll
(1962): "The approach we take today has often been used to abdicate the judicial
function under resounding utterances concerning the importance of judicial selfdenial." Id. at 117.
11 One is entitled to view the very restrictive attitudes of Mr. Justice Brandeis
8
9
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less badgered by the pressure of constitutional issues, are sometimes less doctrinaire about ripeness. In recent years, however,
ripeness requirements have been relaxed in the administrative law
field, in part because of a relaxation in the constitutional law field,
in part because the distinction between the two fields has come to
be felt if not always expressed. I suggest, therefore, that constitutional law cases be put more or less to the side12 (though they
need not be completely ignored) in constructing ripeness requirements in administrative law-the requirements, that is, in cases
of judicial review of the legality of administrative action and controversies between citizen and agency concerning the construction
of statutes.
Il.

THE FOUNDATION CASES ON RIPENESS

A handful of cases arising under the review provision of the
so-called Urgent Deficiencies Act13 and its derivatives have done
most to develop and shape the current concept of ripeness. The
derivative of that act provides that ". . . the district courts shall
have jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside.
annul or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission." 14 Because this provision does not define
"order" and because the language of equity is used, the courts
have been apt to fall back on general principles of justiciability in
defining the requirements of reviewability under this statute. To
be sure, the requirement that there be an "order," i.e., that the
agency's action has been in some degree formal, may exclude
concerning justiciability, particularly his aspersions on the constitutionality of the
declaratory judgment technique in general, as proceeding from his fear that relaxed
notions of justiciability would increase immeasurably the reach of the Supreme Court
in constitutional issues. See, e.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 2i4
(1928). The Rickover case is an excellent example of the juxtaposition in citation and
discussion of ripeness cases from all areas, and of the hopes and fears aroused by the
practice. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, supra note 10.
12 Special considerations are also at work in cases involving state-federal relationships.
This is an area which the Supreme Court may hesitate to enter before the processes
of state law have worked out what may be a modus vivendi to accommodate a potential
jurisdictional clash. See, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402
(1953); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). But despite the possibility
of state-federal conflict, in cases where the exclusive character of the federal jurisdiction
seems clear to the Court it may take jurisdiction where it would otherwise wait. E.g.,
Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943). This is only to say that in
such situations there is a special dimension not present in the usual administrative
law case. See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 339.
13 38 Stat. 219 (1913). This procedure and related provisions are now codified in
28 u.s.c §§ 1253, 1336, 2284, 2321-25 (1958).
14 28 u.s.c. § 1336 (1958).
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from the statute some controversies which are within other heads
of jurisdiction, be it the general "equity" jurisdiction or the
mandamus jurisdiction. But in the earliest of our brace of cases,
United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 15 the same considerations
which were held to exclude review of the Commission's action as
an "order" were held to exclude relief under "the general equity
powers." This decision is one which in the light of subsequent
developments must be considered more carefully than is sometimes now the case. Its pronouncements, taken I would suggest out
of context, have occasionally been misused by some judges. Furthermore, if it be thought that Mr. Justice Brandeis overformulated the requirements of ripeness in the Los Angeles R.R. case,
it does not follow that the decision was wrong or that it would not
still be followed today.
In Los Angeles a railroad company sought review of the "final
value" of its property determined by the ICC under the Valuation Act. It alleged that the valuation was ultra vires the act and
contrary to the due process clause. It contended that the valuation
was an "order," and, if not an "order," that it was reviewable
under the equity jurisdiction because the valuation would impair
its credit. Under the 1913 Valuation Act the Commission was "to
investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all the property
owned or used by every common carrier subject to" the Interstate
Commerce Act. 16 Many reasons for such a valuation were urged in
the congressional debates but none were stated in the act. The
valuation would be prima fade evidence "in all proceedings under
the Act," 17 but no particular proceeding was specified. In administering the valuation project, the Commission adopted valuation theories which it regarded as relevant to rate making. But
even then railroad rate making had little relation to the capital
account. Rates were based not on the total investment but on the
immediate costs of shipment and on competitive conditions surrounding the carriage of particular commodities and classes of
commodities. By 1933, rate making was formally divorced from
the capital account. The valuations, therefore,-and Mr. Justice
Brandeis estimated that there were 1800 railroads involvedwere more or less theoretical constructions of the capital account
quite without immediate relevance to or impact on any of the
Commission's regulatory functions. The enormously complex and
115 273 U.S. 299 (1927).
10 37 Stat. 701, 49 U.S.C. § 19(a) (1958).
11 37 Stat. 703 (1913), 49 U.S.C. § 19(i) (1958).
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controversial attempts of the Supreme Court to establish and to
administer concepts governing the so-called "rate base" (the capital
account) in cases in which the rate base was one of the factors in
an actual rate determination are quite familiar. Even in such cases
the rate base was, together with operating costs and prospective income, but one of the factors in the equation.18 And a rate base
was no sooner determined than changed circumstances required
its correction. The whole valuation project involved the Commission in decades of work which came to nought. Its objectives
were never clear and, in any case, the theories and assumptions on
which it was based became obsolete before it was put to any use.19
It would be difficult to find in the books an occasion for judicial
review more inappropriate and futile.
But this does not end our consideration of the case. In his
opinion Mr. Justice Brandeis said the following:
"The so-called order here complained of is one which
does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing,
any thing; which does not grant or withhold any authority,
privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any
power or facility; ... which does not change the carrier's existing or future status or condition; which does not determine
any right or obligation."20
In the first place, it must be remembered that this formulation
is directed to the contention that the valuation is an "order." Not
every administrative action having practical or potential legal consequences is an order. The formulation, therefore, is not meant
to exclude the possibility of equity jurisdiction. Brandeis was
surely as familiar as any judge with the bill in equity to enjoin
the threatened enforcement of a statute where the remedy at law
was conceived to be inadequate. However, if the statement was
meant to be a complete and exclusive definition of the kind of
actions which are reviewable as "orders," it is no longer accurate,
18 Cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), where the FPC had made
findings as to the lawfulness of past rates "in aid of state regulation." "They are only
a preliminary, interim step towards possible future action-action not by the Commission but by wholly independent agencies. The outcome of those proceedings may
tum on factors other than these findings." Id. at 619, with the Court citing Los Angeles.
19 Professor Sharfman, the historian of the Commission, said, in 1935 [3-A SHARFMAN,
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 319 (1935)], that "the present status of the project
constitutes in itself a monument to the Commission's genius for accomplishment." If
this is meant to suggest that the "accomplishment" was useful, I can find nothing to
support the conclusion in Professor Sharfman's chapter on "The Valuation Project."
My characterization of the project is based on § 2 of this chapter of his book.
20 273 U.S. at 309-10.
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at least if its formulations are given the meanings that would
normally be put on them. I would hazard the opinion, however,
that it was not meant as a complete formulary. 21 The Court starts
out, in the Los Angeles R.R. case, with an action which, for a
thousand and one good reasons, should not be reviewed. It concludes by observing that the formal characteristics of the administrative activity are not of the definitive character which might
compel review even though review is otherwise inappropriate.
Even if the definition is open to criticism, it does not follow that
its application in the context of the case led to an improper result.
The same can be said for the short shrift given to the allegation
that the valuation "injure[d] the credit of the carrier with the
public," which incidentally was in all the circumstances a vague
and implausible allegation. Critics point out that later cases have
found defamation a sufficient "injury" on which to ground a
right to review. 22 But surely it does not follow that every action
of a governmental official which impairs a person's credit is for
that reason alone reviewable. Here, indeed, is ,the very bite of
such doctrines as ripeness and exhaustion, i.e., that, though an
official action, be it an investigation, the filing of a complaint or
what-not, may impair credit or reputation, 28 and though, assuming
that the proposed action is ultra vires, such a consequence is unfortunate, there may be countervailing considerations against immediate judicial intervention.
The twenty-nine years between Los Angeles (1927) and the
Frozen Food Express case24 (1956) saw a movement away from the
restrictive implications of Mr. Justice Brandeis' formulation of
reviewability, at least insofar as more or less formal actions were
in question. A few months after the decision in Los Angeles, the
Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis again writing, decided The Assigned
Car Cases,25 a title given by the reporter to a group of cases seeking to "enjoin and annul an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission establishing a general rule of coal car distribution,
including 'assigned cars'-i.e., privately owned cars and railroad
fuel cars placed at specified mines for the use of particular ship21 But cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942): "The criteria governing judicial review of 'orders' under the
Urgent Ddicicncies Act were defined ••. in United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co."
Id. at 429.
22 As in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
23 Cf. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
2-1 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
25 274 U.S. 564 (1927).
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pers."26 No question, so far as one can tell, was raised whether
this was a reviewable "order" under the Urgent Deficiencies Act.
Distinguishing the case in his dissent in Columbia Broadcasting
System v. United States, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that violations of the rules there promulgated subjected "the carrier to a
fine of 100 dollars for each offense, [and] ... since the failure to
comply with the order would bring immediate legal sanction the
order was held reviewable." 27 In the same dissent he also distinguished the Court's decision in Rochester Telephone Corp.
v. United States,28 in which he had written a justly celebrated
opinion. The primary thrust of Rochester has been to do away
with the so-called "negative order" doctrine, a doctrine which,
riddled with illogical exceptions, had provided that certain determinations were not reviewable as "orders" because they did not
go beyond denying relief and were thus not "directed against"
anyone, i.e., did not command (did not "order"). Rochester made
clear that an order was ripe though it did nothing more than
classify or establish a status, when the effect of the declaration of
status was to make applicable forthwith a corpus of statutes and
regulations.29
The majority in CBS, however, rejected as a requirement of
reviewability that a regulation carry with it a sanction automatic
in form. This case involved an action by a "chain" or "network"
contesting the validity of the FCC's so-called Chain Broadcasting
Regulations. The FCC has the power to license broadcasters on a
periodic basis. Many of these licensees secure a large and important
block of their programs from a so-called chain or network. The
network is not, as such, a broadcaster, though each of the networks
is itself a licensee of a certain number (limited by the Commission)
Id. at 565-66.
316 U.S. at 434. But the question of reviewability was, as has been noted, not
adverted to. Note also that some of the suits were brought by coal mine operators,
coal distributors and large private coal consumers who were not within the command
of the regulation.
28 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
29 Rochester would appear to rob Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938),
of all of its force. The latter was a determination of the ICC that a railroad was
not "an interurban electric railway"; as a consequence it was subject to the Railway
Labor Act. Refusing to review, the Court (per Brandeis, J.) said that this was but
the determination of a "fact" and merely a "preparation for possible action" in the
future, and thus was not an "order" under the Urgent .Deficiencies Act. However,
the Court thereafter entertained a bill in equity to review such a determination, saying
that it "subjected" the railroad to "the requirements" of the Railway Labor Act. This
analysis would seem to bring it within the Rochester formulation of a "reviewable order."
Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
26

27
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of stations. The network and the licensee enter into a contract
which obligates the network to provide programs under given
terms and obligates the licensee to reserve a minimum amount of
time or to take a minimum of programs. The Commission, concerned by the monopolistic power of the chains, issued regulations
governing the terms of the network contracts. Because the Commission had no power directly to regulate the networks, the regulations were directed to the licensee. The regulations were, as stated
by the Commission, nothing more than the expression of the general policy "we will follow in exercising our licensing power." 30
Furthermore, the Commission, after the filing of CBS's complaint,
promulgated a supplementary "minute" to the effect that no
licensee which litigated the validity of the regulation unsuccessfully would lose his license. The chain could suffer no more than
a loss of its contractual advantage; a licensee would be required
to obey the regulation only after an unsuccessful contest.
Let it first be pointed out that at least in theory there are two
distinct questions in the case. The network could never be "subject" to the order. It could no doubt intervene in any of the
licensing proceedings in which the validity of one of its contracts
was in question. But, since the licensee might without contest
choose to accede to the regulation, 31 the occasion for intervention
might never arise. Thus, more acute than the question of "ripeness" is the question of "standing" vel non. To deny relief here
may be equivalent to a denial of all relief, in sum to a decision
that the network has no "legally protected interest." 32 If it be
thought, however, that it does have such an interest, there may be
no later point significantly different from the present, i.e., now,
as later, the claim is that the network's freedom to negotiate is
impaired. To be sure, as a practical matter, the Court could, if
it seemed more appropriate, wait for a licensee challenge and then
if none was forthcoming entertain the network's challenge.
The Court in CBS concluded that the Chain Broadcasting
Regulation had "the force of law" and, having the force of law,
was a reviewable order. The Commission itself had purported to
be exercising the "rule-making power"; its order prescribed "rules
so Quoted in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422
(1942).
31 It is sometimes suggested that a network qua licensee could raise the point. But
a network does not operate its own stations under contract. As to them it has complete freedom and so can never be directly affected by the regulation.
82 I consider the standing question in Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 255, 261 (1961).
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which govern the contractual relationships between the stations
and the networks."33 To the objection that application of the rules
-particularly in the form of a penalty or forfeiture-depended
on a further proceeding (and thus, it is implied, on a further
exercise of administrative discretion), Mr. Justice Stone replied,
"Most rules of conduct having the force of law are not self-executing but require judicial or administrative action to impose their
sanctions." 34 Stone might have said with Holmes that law is nothing
more than a prophecy of what a court will do in a particular case;
and a formally adopted "regulation" rates pretty high in the scale
of prophecy. To be sure, this reasoning does not prove that there
need be or should be intervention before the actual imposition of
sanction, but it is enough, I think, to bring CBS within the underlying premise of Assigned Car. Should the court intervene before
the axe is on its way down? It is universally agreed that it should
in some cases. Administrative law borrows from equity the notion
· that it may be unfair to require a person to incur the risk of
punishment or forfeiture in order to learn whether or not a line
of conduct is valid. The plaintiff in CBS could show no more than
the loss of opportunity for the making of profitable contractsin short, serious financial loss. Its position was similar to that of
the coal miners and consumers who would, if the railroads obeyed
the regulation in Assigned Car, lose prior economic advantages.
To be sure, in the hierarchy of legal values such mediately imposed
losses do not appear to count for so much as the loss decreed against
a named individual by law: imprisonment, fine, forfeiture. The
latter two, however, are in substance just another form of financial
loss.
If it is posited that an administrative action is (a) illegal and
(b) will interfere with the plaintiff's pre-existing freedoms or
powers, why should not present or imminent financial loss suffice? It should, I think, suffice, if the occasion is otherwise propitious.35 It was not propitious in Los Angeles; it was in CBS. After
due formality, after the taking of evidence and the hearing of
interested persons, the agency's policy had been given a precise
form. It is doubtful that in any particular future licensing proceedings the record would have been more favorable for either
administrative or judicial judgment. This does not mean that
33 316 U.S. at 417.
34 Id. at 418.
35 This assumes, of course,
a "legally protected interest."

that it has been decided that the complainant does have
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later proceedings and applications could not throw new light on
the matter. Much administration is a continuous process, and it
is always open to the new light of experience. The administrative
process does not lend itself easily to terminal points. If there is
to be review, a point must be chosen which may be in some
measure arbitrary. Nor is this fatal. If the administrative process
never has said its last word, neither must the court be put to
the election of having only one occasion-and that the indisputably best occasion-to pronounce.
The truth is that the administrative process is often quite unlike an ordinary lawsuit in both form and function; it does not
lend itself easily to the concepts of finality characteristic of the
common-law action. Judicial review is a phase of the administrative process and thus must in some measure partake of its ongoingness. Consider how little like the judgment in a lawsuit is the
determination by a court that, because an agency has given a
wrong reason for its action, it must reconsider its action! No
"rights" are as a consequence of such a decision "finally" adjudicated. Time and again the agency responds simply by republishing its action with the right reasons. If there are occasions
when early review is inopportune, there is on the other hand an
aspect of much administration which warrants review in situations
lacking some traditional aspects of finality. I refer to administration which regulates in a fairly comprehensive fashion, in a fashion
which determines, not isolated transactions, but the organization
and operation of an enterprise. The public has an interest in early
implementation of policy; the regulated person has a legitimate
interest whether to plan, or not to plan, his operation on the basis
of a regulation. This argues for review as soon as it becomes possible
to frame the issues in a form on which the judicial power can act
effectively. Behind the reluctance to accept this position has been
the feeling-now more or less dormant-that the judicial power
is at the worst an alien intruder and at best a clumsy resourcea necessary evil-to be avoided wherever and however possible.
Now that the judiciary is no longer generally hostile to the administrative process and has established and accepted for itself a
limited role, it need no longer operate in the gingerly self-deprecating manner of a guilt-conscious, barely-tolerated intruder. It
need only ask how, given its limited role, it can provide efficiently,
with due regard for its limited competence, the service which it is
duly bound to give to those who have a legitimate interest in the
legality of the challenged action.
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Storer Broadcasting Co. 36 and Frozen Food, 31 both in the same
volume of the Supreme Court reports, can be taken to extend
somewhat further than CBS the notions of reviewable order and
ripeness. Storer, as was true of CBS, involved a "legislative" regulation; it provided that no person could have more than a certain
number of broadcasting licenses; and, under the subsidiary regulation, certain interlocking stock ownerships could constitute ownership. The basic regulation, of course, could operate only as to
future additional grants, but a purchase of stock either in the
Storer Company or in another existing licensed operation might
bring to pass a holding by Storer in excess of the allowed ma.ximum. I>Jssenting, Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the case was not
within the principle of CBS, or even within the principle of the
just recently decided Frozen Food; 38 the injury could accrue, he
agreed, only if Storer applied for and was denied an additional
station: the potentiality of a denial did not threaten the present
investment. 39 The majority noted that "Storer cannot cogently
plan its present or future operations. It cannot plan to enlarge
the number of its standard or FM stations, and at any moment the
purchaser of Storer's voting stock by some member of the public
could endanger its existing structure." 40
Frozen Food extends CBS in another respect, in a respect
which one may characterize as formal. The Interstate Commerce
Act requires a license for motor carriage of goods but exempts
from the requirement the carriage of "agricultural commodities."41 Controversy has raged over the years as to the meaning
of "agricultural commodities." The great difficulty is to distinguish
between exempt agricultural commodities and non-exempt "manufactured products thereof," more particularly to find the point
at which "processing" becomes "manufacturing." The ICC undertook a full-scale "investigation" in which the carriers, the Secretary
of Agriculture, state utility commissions, some states, etc., participated. It issued a "Report" entitled "Determination of Exempted
Agricultural Commodities." 42 This report stated the general prinUnited States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
38 From which he also dissented.
39 Mr. Justice Harlan did not address himself specifically to the possibility of a
stock purchase bringing on a violation of the regulation. He might say that this remote
possibility does not in fact work any immediate loss of the present investment.
40 351 U.S. at 200.
41 Motor Carrier Act § 203(b)(6), 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(6) (1958).
42 52 M.C.C. 511 (1951).
36

37
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ciples for distinguishing between processing and manufacturing.
It applied the principles to certain "groups," "classes" and individual products; some of these applications did not command
a unanimous vote. The final section of the report is headed "Findings" and embodies a list of exempted commodities (impliedly
or expressly. excluding certain others from the exempted class).
The report concludes: "An appropriate order will be entered
discontinuing the proceeding." 43 It is common ground that this
is not a "regulation" in the sense that a disregard of it would be
a punishable violation of the statute. It is a so-called "interpretive"
regulation. It was to serve as a prima facie guide in Commission
cease-and-desist proceedings or in Commission enforcement policy,
i.e., in its decisions to initiate judicial proceedings for the violation of the statute itself. Mr. Justice Harlan, in dissent, noted that
despite the report the Commission in cease-and-desist proceedings
was willing to hear new evidence and reconsider its determinations
with respect to particular commodities.44 The plaintiff in Frozen
Food, at least in its complaint if not by later evidence, challenged
the "order" in its applications to nearly all the classes, groups, and
individual items insofar as it denied exemptions. The Secretary
of Agriculture intervened, supporting the plaintiff, Frozen Food,
as to eight or so of these items. The trial court dismissed the
action, citing Los Angeles. The Court reversed. The order "has
an immediate and practical 'impact on carriers who are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well. The 'order' of the
Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from
the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so
at the risk of incurring criminal penalties."45
Frozen Food is, in my opinion, correct in refusing to make an
absolute distinction between a "legislative" and an "interpretive"
regulation. I do, however, question the propriety of judicial review
of the issues as actually framed in that case. Equity has been prepared to enjoin a "threat" of prosecution, a "threat," that is to
say, in the sense of a decision or course of decision to initiate judicial enforcement based on an official interpretation. An interpretative regulation would seem capable of satisfying both the
Id. at 557-58.
It had indeed done so in the companion case, East Texas Lines v. Frozen Food
Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956), though it did not alter its earlier conclusion. That case
did involve a cease-and-desist order forbidding the carriage of frozen poultry without
a license.
45 351 U.S. at 44.
43

44
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formal order requirement and the basic immediacy requirement
of equity; but it does not follow that every formal interpretation
should be forthwith reviewed, whether as an order or in equity.
In Frozen Food the issues as framed were not well-adapted to
review, and the plaintiff's need was not great. The plaintiff's
pleading does not go beyond the assertion that the Commission
had improperly classified a few dozen or so products. No doubt
there is some common question running through a number of
these controversies, although the Court does not explicate it.
The Court does not isolate any general question for consideration.
It simply throws back to the district court a job which threatens
to duplicate the Commission's general investigation. Represented
before the Court are the Commission, Frozen Food, the Secretary
of Agriculture, and some trucking associations and railroads. The
order does not rest on a formal record. Are the various agricultural
interests to be summoned, evidence heard on each and every item,
and then, as to each, decision made? 46 Given the awkwardness of
judicial review of such issues, one is more amazed at the conclusion that it was urgently needed. In the companion case Frozen
Food's right to carry frozen poultry was squarely raised by the
Commission's cease-and-desist order. The question common to all
the cases, the line between processing and manufacturing, was
ruled on there by the Court. That case itself exposed the purely
fictitious character of the risk of criminal prosecution: it made it
clear that the Commission was proceeding case by case, using a
prospective cease-and-desist order approach. And there was nothing in the pleadings to suggest that Frozen Food's plans for the
future went beyond its current concern with chickens. The case,
in my opinion, reflects a disposition, not uncommon in the decisions and discussion in this area, to decide on the basis of formal
rather than practical criteria of ripeness: that at least is true of
both the majority and the minority opinions in Frozen Food.
Frozen Food can be taken to embody the concept that an
administrative action having a fairly formal aspect is reviewable
(at least as an "order") despite the fact that its precise dispositive
character is uncertain or ambiguous. If despite its inconclusive dispositive character an administrative action has evoked a clear-cut
legal question as to its validity and if the plaintiff's interest is substantial, review, in my opinion, is not inappropriate. Frozen Food,
46 In Lester C. Newton Trucking Co. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 600 (D. Del. 1962),
review was of an "interpretative order" as to certain products. The court refused to
review general language in the order except as it applied to the products in question.
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to be sure, is strictly, as is Storer, a decision as to whether the
action is a reviewable order under the Urgent Deficiencies Act.
But it would not be going too far, I think, to say that where no
provision for review is made, the general principles deducible
from those cases should govern a review of any formal act whether
by declaration or equity procedure. The failure to provide for
review may, of course, suggest a question of reviewability vel non.
But if that obstacle is hurdled, the principles developed in the
Urgent Deficiencies Act cases should govern. 47 On those principles
I would think that Eccles v. Peoples Bank48 was wrongly decided.
That was a case of a completed, formal, dispositive order conditioning the sale of plaintiff's stock. It is very hard to follow Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's demonstration that the plaintiff's concern
was "too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial determinations. "40
47 In the following cases where relief was given, the precise legal effect of the action
was uncertain. Mid-Valley Distilling Corp. v. De Carlo, 161 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1947)
(construed as an order of "suspension, revocation or annulment"); Parkhill Truck Co.
v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Okla. 1961) (the construction of plaintiff's license
having been taken as a premise for the grant of a license to another, involved in effect
an attack on the license grant, and plaintiff was held entitled to a hearing before
grant); Brigham v. FCC, 276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960) (FCC declaratory ruling as to
licensee's responsibility reviewable-both parties agreed to review, citing inter alia Caples
Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where, however, question of review•
ability was not adverted to). Note that if the declaratory ruling is pursuant to § 5(d)
of the APA, the ruling has "like effect as in the case of other orders," and is thus
reviewable.
.
Quite difficult to place and judge in my scheme is Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167
F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The FCC in its so-called "Blue Book," a "Report" on "Public
Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees," cited plaintiff's record as a bad example. Plaintiff sued for declaratory relief under the APA. At the same time plaintiff's license was
simultaneously undergoing renewal proceedings involving precisely the same issue. The
court dismissed on the ground of no "agency action," after first holding that the FCC's
remarks were an unprivileged libel. It was perhaps the court's view that the proper
relief was an action in libel (plaintiff: was seeking withdrawal of the remarks). But is
this not a case of activity within the area of administrative investigation more or less
ancillary to the performance of its licensing function? It is at best a doubtful case
for review, and, since Hearst could canvass the same question in the renewal proceedings,
there seems no reason for stretching reviewability concepts. One judge concurred, without opinion, in the result. Hearst is cited by Bazelon, J., in Kukatush Mining Corp. v.
SEC, 309 F.2d 647, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1962), apropos of the publication of a list of securities
being, in the opinion of the SEC, marketed in violation of the Securities Act. Both
majority and minority, however, do give it as their opinion that the publication of
this list without a hearing is not ultra vires. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 290 (5th
Cir. 1962).
48 333 U.S. 426 (1948). I do not regard Continental Bank 8e Trust Co. v. Martin,
303 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1962), as following Eccles. The court there interpreted the order
to the bank to increase its capital as a preliminary to a later cease-and-desist order.
It emphasized particularly the novelty of the Board's proceeding. It was obviously concerned with giving the Board further opportunity to develop its procedure. The court
might have allowed review, but its decision is supportable as an exercise of discretion.
49 333 U.S. at 432. He emphasized that sanction for violation of the condition was
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Now, criteria for determining "ripeness" are more difficult
where the administrative action does not have the usual indicia of
formality supplied by a "regulation," an "order," or a pleading.
One can suppose that Mr. Justice Harlan's demand in Frozen
Food for a more formal criterion was based on a belief that it was
necessary in order that "the line be drawn" somewhere. If risk
of legal sanction or doubt as to the future suffices, then will it not
follow that whenever an agency indicates an adverse attitude the
occasion is ripe for judicial action; indeed, would it not be enough
that the plaintiff is in doubt and the agency is not prepared to
relieve his doubt? To this, the response might be, why not indeed?
Why not remove the plaintiff's doubt? The answer is that there are
cases where, though no formal action has been taken, it is proper
to grant relief and that there are cases where it is not; and this
uncertainty does constitute an admission that the lack of a
strictly formal test creates difficulties. But do these difficulties go
beyond the intellectual burden thus placed on the courts, a burden
which is not in itself a reason against flexibility? To this the answer must be that there remains the risk, which, if it should not
be exaggerated, nevertheless has some weight, that interference
with the administrative process at this early stage may be inappropriate. Individuals may be encouraged to run to the courts early
and late with their fears, their doubts and their recalcitrance.
Negotiation is the major mode of administration, of resolving the
continuous uncertainties of fact and law. If it is made too easy
to bring every administrative expression, however informal, into
court, negotiation may be hampered. Those who feel that the
public authorities have a basically unfair leverage will welcome
this. Those who think that for the most part private and public
power are fairly matched will not wish to put too many obstac_les
in the path of accommodation. I would conclude that presumptively informal expressions covering the meaning and application
of a statute do not warrant judicial determination of the controversy, but that the presumption can be overcome.

III.

THE APPROACH OF EQUITY

The proper approach at this point is the approach of equity.
Let us refer once more to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's formulation.
a future matter. This hardly disposed of the claim accepted as decisive by the minority
that the condition impaired the present marketability of the stock.
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We look to ttvo aspects: (1) the posture of the question at issueits reducibility to judicial determination, and (2) the predicament
of the plaintiff-whether he, as equity traditionally puts it, has
an adequate remedy at law. Let us canvass this approach by instancing a few representative cases. Consider the equitable doctrine that, though normally the alleged improper enforcement of
a criminal statute will not be enjoined, repeated threats of enforcement may suffice to ground jurisdiction. This rule seeks to
preserve administrative discretion as to enforcement; but if the
plaintiff is subjected to a continuing risk of substantial proportions, a risk which he is unable to terminate by appeals to the usual
processes of the law, he makes a case for equitable relief. It would
seem that it should not be a "threat" in its literal sense which is
required, but a substantial and immediate risk of irreparable injury. The "threat" is ordinarily taken as evidence of the intent
of the administrative agency to take action, but it should be considered as an instance of a broader category, as simply one kind of
concrete manifestation of the likelihood of "irreparable injury." 50
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central
R.R.,r, 1 said in support of plaintiff's bill in equity that "it is
essential to the protection of the rights asserted"; he noted "the
peculiar difficulty which confronts" a plaintiff when subject to
one of two competing jurisdictions. If "irreparable injury" is
likely, a "threat" should not be required. Indeed, one might go
farther and not invariably require the injury to be "irreparable."
Judgment should be keyed to the relative value of early and later
review as determined by practical considerations of judicial competence, administrative efficiency and party need. Thus, in Shields,
the "threat" of "criminal prosecution" was purely formal. If the
60 Embassy Dairy, Inc. v. Camalier, 211 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1954), is a characteristic
case. Plaintiff protested the validity of an order forbidding the processing of milk.
Violation of the order was punishable as a crime. Cf. Fanner v. United Elec. Union, 211
F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which a union was threatened with immediate disqualification as a lawful collective bargaining agent. This might result in exclusion from
ballots and other irreparable injury. Note also the lack of any other remedy, and see
Keopke v. Fontecchio, 177 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1949). With these cases is to be compared
the hostility toward declaratory relief shown in Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426
(1948), discussed supra.
I do not deal with cases involving constitutional issues other than to repeat my
suggestion that restrictive notions of justiciability displayed in declaratory and equity
proceedings reflect caution in the exercise of the constitutional adjudication function.
Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). To what degree such caution
is consistently displayed is a study in itself.
61 305 U.S. 177, 183 (1938).
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railroad were denied early review and required to present its defense in a prosecution for failing to post notices under the Railway Labor Act,52 it would be understood that the purpose of the
lawsuit was to test the question of validity. It is unthinkable that
a penalty would have been imposed on the railroad for raising an
obviously bona fide claim. And the same is true of many so-called
"threats." Of course, where vindictive officers threaten large and
numerous penalties attempting thus to avoid judicial review, the
"threat of irreparable injury" is very real. I make the point, rather,
that, where as in Shields there are excellent reasons for immediate
clarification and there are present neither "threats" nor "irreparable injury" in any realistic sense, the court should nevertheless take jurisdiction. On the other hand, not every "threat" suffices; the beginning of an investigation, the filing of a complaint
is a "threat"; but clearly the administrative process must, other
than in exceptional circumstances, be allowed to take its course,58
and will ordinarily provide an "adequate remedy." It is well
established that the potentially adverse consequences of litigation
-expense, even loss of credit and reputation-may have to be
borne.54 It is hoped that, if the individual eventually prevails on
the merits, at least his reputation if not his pocketbook will be
refurbished. This, of course, will not always happen. If there is
a clean-cut question of jurisdiction anterior to the merits and,
despite later success on the jurisdictional question, trial of the
merits will have worked irreversible loss of reputation, there
52 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63
(1958).
53 In this sense Miles Lab., Inc. v. FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1944), is a standard
case. See also Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 207 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1953), in•
volving a "threat" by the Maritime Administration to collect moneys allegedly owing
by asserting a set-off against moneys owing to the plaintiff (which had brought a
declaratory action). Plaintiff, of course, had the usual remedy in the Court of Claims
to sue for sums owing. Furthermore, the claim of the United States was based on the
renegotiation of a contract which plaintiff was attempting to contest in this way rather
than by the statutory administrative and judicial procedure.
There is little point in trying to understand Bata Shoe Co. v. Perkins, 33 F. Supp.
508 (D.D.C. 1940). On one view of the pleadings the plaintiffs were being compelled
to take an unwarranted risk. But it is impossible to determine from the confusing
opinion what the issues were.
54 Once more one must distinguish the problem in these cases from that in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., discussed in the text at notes 4-5 supra. That case involved a final action which threatened to injure plaintiff's reputation. The question
was whether reputation is legally protected against an allegedly illegal exercise of public
power so as to entitle the plaintiff to review. But the question in "ripeness" and "exhaustion" cases is whether injury to reputation and credit is sufficient to justify review
now rather than later.
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should be immediate review. 55 But such a case is by its definition
exceptional.
IV.

SOME DISPARATE RIPENESS CASES

There still remain for consideration a handful of cases-some
typical, some not-which exemplify the difficulty of applying the
general approach advocated here. They are all cases, as one would
expect, in which the controversy has not yet been "firmed up" to
a decisive administrative action. A number of them had substantial "administrative" significance. Consider Houston Post
Co. v. United States. 56 This was an attempt by a stranger to a
licensing proceeding to review statements in an opinion to which
the licensee himself either could not or would not take exception.
The FCC, in renewing the license of a certain station, declared
that the licensee must not in the future "censor" political broadcasts. To obey this injunction involved some danger because of
the then existing uncertainty as to whether the licensee was itself
liable for all defamatory utterances broadcast by it.57 The licensee,
itself, was prepared to bow to the FCC's view and promise to behave. The phenomenon was not a new one. Somewhat earlier, in
the famous May-fioweri 8 decision, the Commission had renewed
a license on condition that the licensee would not "editorialize,"
i.e., express its opinion on public issues. Is there any way of testing such resolutions short of "putting one's license on the line"?
The Houston Post tried to review such a pronouncement as an
"order" applicable to all licensees. Judge Hutcheson could not
find his way clear to hold that doctrinal pronouncements in the
course of a decision were reviewable by non-parties, though he did
go on to give an "advisory" opinion in the plaintiff's favor. Perhaps plaintiff's mistake was in seeking review of the "opinion" as
an "order" under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. At that time CBS
had, but Frozen Food had not, been decided. If Frozen Food's
umbrella does not cover "opinions," perhaps equity should be
1111 I have so argued in The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L.
REv. 327 (1963).
56 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
57 The Supreme Court later decided that a licensee was not liable for defamatory
broadcasts which it was without power to censor. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v.
WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
liS Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). In its report on editorializing
by broadcast licensees, the Commission abandoned its rule against licensee self-expression
so long as the licensee gives fair representation to competing views. 1 p & F RADIO
REcs. 11 91:21 (1949).
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prepared to avoid the risk to plaintiff of a loss of license. Is there
indeed such a risk? Would the Commission forfeit the license of
one who sought a bona fide test of the issue? Should it not be
made clear by the agency that the declaratory procedure of section 5(d) of the APA is available?
We are presented here with a phenomenon sometimes called
"jawbone" administration. The FCC cannot be completely absolved of a suspicion that it uses the leverage of license risk to
insulate from review doubtful applications of its powers. In a
recent case, of some significance, revoking a license for alleged
obscenities, an exercise of power raising questions under the first
amendment, the FCC was careful to place its decision on an alternate ground which, with an apparent eye to judicial review, the
Commission anticipatorily pronounced would alone have moved
it to revoke. 59 It might at least, as it did in CBS, devise a procedure
to eliminate the risk of challenge, and it may be that it is indeed
developing procedures to that end. 60 There might still be a fear
of retaliation, given the vague, highly discretionary powers of the
Commission. However, our law-world is not a perfect one and
some policy of inviting judicial review of basic questions would
eliminate most of the risk. One might ask whether there is in fact
a real problem here, and, if so, what it is. A great deal is said in
administrative and judicial opinions by way of argumentation and
example which awakens doubts and fears among lawyers and the
public. To subject all the expressions and applications of an
opinion to judicial review would increase the hazards of ·writing
opinions, would constrict the desirable area of negotiation and
would embarrass the courts. The answer may be not an absolute
rule against review, but equitable discretion exercised along the
broad lines developed here. In applying this discretion a court
may well take into account the apparent disposition of an agency,
59

Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).

oo The Commission has on occasion given "declaratory rulings," warnings, etc., to
licensees. Some of these are asked for by the licensee; some are in reply to complaints.
In two cases of declaratory rulings no objection was taken to review. Brigham v. FCC,
276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960); Caples Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
The Commission also has the power to issue cease-and-desist orders. In Metropolitan
Broadcasting Corp., 19 P &: F RA.mo REcs. 602 (F.C.C. Jan. 6, 1960), the Commission
addressed a letter to a licensee "with reference to certain applications," concluding,
"It is expected that in the future operations of all your stations you will be guided
by the views which we have set forth above." How does the licensee cope with such a
letter? Could he ask that it be denominated a "declaratory ruling," a "cease-and-desist
order"? If formally denominated a "declaratory ruling," it should be reviewable under
APA§ 5(d).
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by the latent threat of its power, to extend its reach into debatable
areas by devices calculated to avoid judicial review.
A somewhat similar constellation of factors was involved in the
well-known Belco Products Co. v. lvI.cNutt. 61 Helco proposed a
shipment of poppy seed with a "harmless vegetable dye." It sought
an opinion from the Food and Drug Administration as to whether
the product was "adulterated." The Commissioner gave his opinion that it was. Helco then sought to learn from the Attorney
General whether he agreed and whether the United States would
institute condemnation. The Attorney General replied that he
was authorized "by law to give opinions only to the President
and heads of Executive Departments." 62 Helco then sought a
declaratory judgment. The court was unwilling on this record
to bring the case within the category of "threats" because the
declaration of the Administrator was,several steps removed from
a threat of prosecution; the Attorney General's action was not
controlled by the Administrator's. Similar reasons have been used
to deny declaratory relief in cases under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, a law which, full of baffling questions of application, gives
rise to the penalty of double wage payments. There is no formal
administrative proceeding to help employers in doubt. In one case
the court stated: "It cannot be said that the petitioner is seeking
advice upon a purely hypothetical situation. The petitioner has
a real problem, and a response by the Court would undoubtedly
be of immediate benefit to it in a concrete way." 63
But "interpretative bulletins" by the Administrator, the court
in Belco concluded, did not create an "actual controversy." The
Administrator has not "threatened" enforcement and the Attorney
General, who has the ultimate authority, has done nothing. This
nice analysis of the imminence of the "threat" does not, of course,
deal realistically with the likelihood of irreparable injury. It does,
no doubt, have relevance to the opportunities for the exercise of
discretion prior to enforcement or settlement which may be pertinent to a case of this sort, particularly if the case were thought to
involve not a general question but one of application. It is just
when the question raised is one of particular application to plaintiff that early declaratory procedure causes the most difficulty for
61
62
63

137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
Id. at 682.
F. W. Maurer &: Sons Co. v. Andrews, 30 F. Supp. 637, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
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the courts. In Helco the court relied, for example, on John P.
Agnew & Co. v. Hoage, 64 in which an employer sought to know
whether certain persons were employees; if so, he would be obliged
to take out compensation insurance. If he cannot find the answer
he will, of course, have to spend money on insurance which may
turn out to be unnecessary. This is surely unfortunate, and a legal
system which does not provide machinery for such advance determination is to that degree defective. But it is at least a question
whether the court's declaratory judgment procedure should fill
up such a large and widespread procedural gap. One might see the
translation of administration into the courts if each proposed application could be transferred there.
If, in Helco, a single pilot shipment of poppy seed were in
question, the risk to plaintiff would not be a great one. But the
Administrator has at times _instituted multiple seizures prior to
the trial of any of them. This tactic is obviously designed to put
the product off the market before it is adjudicated to be offensive. 611
The trade, at least, feels that the threat of this exercise of power
is used to bring it to book in doubtful cases. Perhaps the abuse of
power, if any, is inherent in the statutory scheme. The leverage
inherent in discretion to enforce the law is to some extent unavoidable and to some extent desirable in promoting negotiation
and settlement in areas of legal or factual doubt. To intervene
judicially at the point where discretion has not ripened into formal
determination, either by general rule or by an order in the plaintiff's case, requires the exercise of a tactful and discriminating
judgment. It would seem that what is needed in situations of this
type, i.e., where persons are required to make difficult legal judgments at the risk of penalties, is a flexible, perhaps discretionary,
administrative procedure: one which permits the question to be
"firmed up" for a declaratory order. It is at least a question
whether, given the failure to provide such a procedure, the courts
should fill the gap by allowing free and regular resort to the
declaratory and equity power.
It remains to consider one case which most students, including
myself, have found it hard to accept. It is, nevertheless, a case
99 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
In one such case, Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. Ewing, 87 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C.
1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 594 (1950), by a six-to-two vote, a trial court, believing tbe multiple seizure provision to be misused and finding no danger to health, enjoined all
but one suit. On appeal tbe majority held tbat tbe Government's statutory right to
multiple seizure was absolute.
64
65
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which when closely studied involves some subtleties which, if
not determinative of the result, do create problems. This is International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd. 66 The plaintiffs were a
local union and two of its officers, both resident aliens. They sued
on behalf of the union and all resident aliens. The action was one
for injunction and declaration against the District Director of
Immigration at Seattle. The union represented seasonal workers
in the Alaska fish canneries who were resident in the continental
United States. Resident aliens who leave the United States (even
for a moment, unless it be as seaman on an American ship) are
required on reentry to go through the same inspection process
and, with certain exceptions, are subject to the same grounds of
exclusion as a new entrant. The grounds of exclusion are much
more numerous than the grounds for deportation. For example,
a resident alien may be deported if he has been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of
entry or at any time after entry is convicted of two such crimes.
A new entrant is excludable if he has at any time been convicted
of one such crime. In this and in other respects involving disreputable or unpleasant characteristics, one not deportable is
excludable on reentry. The Director of Immigration had taken
the position that a permanent resident alien who had gone from
the continental United States to Alaska was excludable on the
same terms as one who had gone to a foreign country. The plaintiffs challenged the interpretation and, if correct, its constitutionality. They pleaded that "there is a present threat . . . to . . .
status." The individual plaintiffs also alleged that they and three
others were presently the object of deportation proceedings. The
district court took jurisdiction and upheld the director's interpretation.67 A majority of the Supreme Court-the opinion by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter-held that this was not "a lawsuit to
enforce a right; it is an endeavor to obtain a court's assurance
that a statute does not govern hypothetical situations that may
or may not make the challenged statute applicable." 68 Perhaps
oo 347 U.S. 222 (1954). The lower court took jurisdiction and gave judgment for
the defendant. 111 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Wash. 1953). The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and gave directions to dismiss the complaint.
67 This interpretation has since been held to be wrong. United States ex rel. Alcantra
v, Boyd, 222 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1955).
68 347 U.S. at 224. All of his citations are to constitutional cases. It is true that
the plaintiffs did raise a constitutional issue, but the issue of statutory construction was
in the forefront. Not even Mr. Justice Black, who disliked the law, in dissenting (with
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter is right in characterizing the case as
"hypothetical" in a sense in which the other cases with which we
have dealt are not, since no facts are pleaded as to the potential
excludability of the plaintiffs, though one might suggest as an
analogy to the contrary his own decision in Rochester, in which it
was found sufficient that the Commission's action established a
"status." However, the only necessary consequence of the facts
pleaded by the plaintiffs is that, assuming that they do go to
Alaska and do return, they will be put through inspection as new
entrants. This procedural modification of one's status is perhaps
nothing more than unpleasant. None of the plaintiffs alleges that
he or any one of the class has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or has a loathsome disease, or is likely to become
a public charge, or is engaged in anarchist or subversive activity,
etc. But are such self-accusing allegations the price of a judicial
determination as to whether one may leave the country without
the risk of exclusion on such grounds? It might perhaps have been
possible to take a middle course: to allege, for example, that there
were some-would it be necessary to name them?-who had been
convicted of a crime or in some other concrete way were in
jeopardy. But it should be remembered that there were many
"radicals" among the longshoremen, that a number were already
the object of deportation proceedings or of suspicion, and that the
discretion of the authorities to exclude is wider than to deport and
thus might afford considerable additional leverage against alleged
"subversives." No doubt an argument can be made that one whose
freedom of movement is in question because of a disreputable past
(though not all of these grounds are disreputable) is not entitled
to know the precise limits of his freedom. On the other hand, one
who is not wholly sympathetic with the Draconian character of this
legislation would hesitate to push its strictures any farther than
is necessary. In any case, even a wrongdoer is entitled to know
his rights. It is at this point that I must insist again on the truism
that the concept of a case is not a precise one. It is a concept for
the administration of justice. It points to what a court can appropriately do and what in justice it should do. Each of these factors,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter said elsewhere, affects the other: " ...
whether 'justiciability' exists ... has most often turned on evaluatMr. Justice Douglas) had much hope of invalidating it on the constitutional issue.
"Maybe this is what Congress meant. . . . And maybe in these times such a law would
be held constitutional." Id. at 226.
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ing both the appropriateness of the issues for decision by courts
and the hardship of denying judicial relief." 69 In Boyd, hardship
was clear despite the fact that its incidence with respect to any
particular plaintiff was speculative; and the issue for decision as
made by the pleadings was equally clear, namely, whether on his
return a resident alien who has been to Alaska has the same status
as an alien entering from a foreign country. This question was
answered two years later in an actual exclusion case in precisely
the same form as it was presented in Boyd, and nothing relevant
to the issue had been added to the record by way of specific or
general fact. 70 In determining whether an issue is ripe for decision
one must focus his attention on (though not limit it to) the issue
made. If it is an organically separate issue, it does not cease to be
one because it implicates a further range of issues which are not yet
ripe.71
V.

REVIEWABLE ORDERS

Statutes establishing administrative powers, particularly those
exercised by the full-fledged administrative agency, often provide
for review. The statutes originally providing for review of ICC
actions 72 stated simply that suits to enjoin, etc., any "order" of
the Commission should be brought in the district court. Later
statutes dealing with other agencies are more specific and these
specifics may operate in a restrictive fashion. The addition of the
word "final" before the word "order" is not, however, restrictive,
since finality is taken by the courts in a broad sense. Thus, approval of a protested rate pending a hearing is a "final order."
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951).
But might a proponent of the Boyd case argue that, when finally a court was
presented with an actual exclusion, as in the later case, the court was then led to
pause and finally to reject a conclusion which would have so drastic an effect on the
individual actually before them?
71 A perhaps extreme instance of deciding one issue isolated from a large group
of implicated, but not yet ripe, issues is Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. I (1961) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
72 For the most part, ICC orders are still reviewed under this so-called Urgent
Deficiencies Act procedure, the name coming from the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913,
which established the form and venue of review. Later provisions, e.g., those relating
to review of actions under the Motor Carrier Act § 205(h), 49 Stat. 550 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
§ 305(g) (1958), were less laconic, but the additional definition probably added nothing
of substance: "Any final order made under this chapter shall be subject to the same right
of relief in court by any party in interest as is now provided in respect to orders of
the Commission made under Chapter I of this title." (Emphasis added.) The italicized
words embody concepts worked out by the Court for review of "orders" under the
Urgent Deficiencies Act.
60

70
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Finality depends, it is said, "upon a realistic appraisal of the consequences of such action"; the test is the "irreparable injury
threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings which
attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may follow." 73 But a statute which
provides for review of an "order" following a stated course of
procedure will preclude the statutory review of the action qua
"order" where the stated administrative process has not been completed or is not a prelude to the action in question. This, of course,
does not mean that review is excluded in such cases. If not reviewable under the statute, the action may be reviewed in "equity"
or by mandamus or declaratory order. The difference may or may
not be significant. If the "orders" of an agency are reviewable in
a court of appeals, venue, of course, will be different, since "nonstatutory" review will be in the form of an original action in a
district court. Furthermore, whereas statutory review may be
available as a matter of course, equity may require "irreparable
injury," and a court may insist, in a mandamus proceeding, on a
"clear" violation of law.
The great foundation cases with which we have dealt in
defining the concept of ripeness were cases in which, strictly
viewed, the question was whether the protested action of the ICC
was an "order" under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. We have now
come to see that under that procedure the questions of ripeness
and reviewable order should be treated as almost, if not exactly,
the same question; the statutory reviewing court is a district court
which almost from the beginning has drawn its inspiration and its
definitions from principles of equity. If an action of the ICC would
satisfy the ripeness requirements of a court of equity, it would
seem for the most part that it should qualify as an "order" under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act. Of course, the notion of an "order"
implies some formal characteristics. Thus, a refusal to take juris73 Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.) (Fahy, J., in dissenting, argued that one must proceed by bill in equity in a district court), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 990 (1954). Accord, Trans-Pacific Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime Bd.,
302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (agency action suspending assessment of fine on one of
its members by a steamship association). Compare Local 438, Constr. Union v. Curry,
371 U.S. 542 (1963); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 850 (1962), applying the rule of substance rather than form in determining
whether an order of a lower court is final.
Conversely, a statute making reviewable "any order" will be read to require "finality.''
McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1961); Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 243 F.2d
607 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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diction is not an "order," and so mandamus is the proper remedy. 74
When the so-called "negative order" doctrine prevailed, certain
actions refusing relief on the merits were held not to be "orders."
Yet, in one instance a so-called "negative order"-not reviewable
as an "order" 75-was held reviewable in "equity"; 76 but shortly
thereafter Rochester71 did away with the "negative order" doctrine, and such an order would, it seems, now be reviewable as
an "order."
In the much-cited case of FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,1 8
the plaintiff sought review, as an "order," of the commencement
by "an order" of an investigation to determine "the ownership,
operation, management, and control" of the plaintiff. The plaintiff challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission. Review was
provided by the statute for orders arising out of "proceedings
under the Act"; there were requirements in the judicial review
provision that there must have been a petition for "rehearing,"
that there be filed in a court a "transcript of records," that if findings were supported by "substantial evidence" they be affirmed,
etc. It would, of course, have been sufficient to hold that the
"order" was not reviewable because it was "preliminary," but
the Court spoke in more general terms: "The provision for
review thus relates to orders of a definitive character dealing with
the merits of a proceeding before the Commission and resulting
from a hearing upon evidence ...." 79
This is a perfectly possible reading of the statute, but it has
not been followed. It would mean that a great many orders of the
FPC, which should be and will be reviewed, would have to be reviewed not in the regular statutory review courts (the courts of
appeals) but by original bill in equity. There may, as has been
suggested, be reasons for distinguishing the character of review
afforded to different actions of an agency. Be that as it may, the
earlier decisions were inclined to take a narrow view of a review- ·
74 United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S. 638 (1918); ICC v.
United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912). At this time the venue of
mandamus actions was restricted to the District of Columbia which was different from
that as to proceedings to review an "order."
71i Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938) (determination that plaintiff was
not an "interurban electric railway" not an "order').
76 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) (reviewing in equity an ICC
determination that plaintiff was not an "interurban electric railway').
77 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
78 304 U.S. 375 (1938).
79 Id. at 384.
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able order under the statute. It has been held that a decision of
the SEC refusing confidential treatment to documents in its files
is not an order; 80 thus, though it is reviewable, it must be reviewed
by a bill in equity. 81 But by and large simplicity of system argued
against such a distinction. Typical is Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
FPC. 82 This was an order suspending a rate filing. There had been
no hearing, no record, no evidence, no findings. The test applied
by the court was simply whether the order "finally determines the
legal rights of the parties." 83 This is, perhaps, a somewhat elusive
test, since interlocutory rulings can usually be reconsidered. But
it implies finality in the sense that later review comes too late to
protect the asserted right. In a more recent case in the same circuit contesting the acceptance of a rate filing, the court, making
specific reference to the language quoted above from Metropolitan, which, read literally, would have barred review under the
statute, said:
"Such language must be read in relation to the facts of the
case and, so limited, does not establish an inflexible standard
requiring a conventional hearing.... An order ... is reviewable when action taken in advance of hearings or adjudication
result in the setting of legal consequences." 84
In some cases, however, courts have refused to review FPC
regulations as "orders," and in so doing have fallen back on the
language of Metropolitan emphasizing the requirement of a hearing and a record. In one of these cases, Judge Bazelon goes so far
as to say that "an appellate court has no intelligible basis for decision unless a subordinate tribunal has made a record fully encompassing the issues." 85 He distinguishes CBS on the ground that
80 Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 99 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir.
1938) (citing the Metropolitan case).
81 Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939). It was
at this same time that the Supreme Court was going through the minuet of holding that
a determination of the ICC which was not an "order" had to be reviewed by bill in
equity. See notes 75-76 supra.
82 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956).
83 Id. at 474.
84 Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
837 (1958); accord, Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1959). The following are
cases in which an order has been held not reviewable: Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d
290 (5th Cir. 1962) (statements by FPC that escalation clauses in filed contracts would
not be given effect-these are clauses providing for future increases in contract rates);
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 285 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1960) (rejecting gas company's
offer of a rate settlement).
85 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1950). To the
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in that case review was in a district court which could make a
record. The remedy, therefore, if any, is by an original bill in
equity. It is of interest that it was just at this time (1950) that
the Hobbs Act86 was passed. This act transferred the venue for
review of the particular orders of certain agencies from the district courts to the courts of appeals and provided that, in the absence of a record, the court, if a genuine issue of fact is presented,
should transfer the proceedings to a district court. This act does
not, however, cover the FPC, and again in 1956 it was held, in
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 81 that "rules of general applicability" are not reviewable under section 19(b) of the Natural
Gas Act. The court there underlines the absence of "definitive
orders entered after hearing and upon completion of the administrative process." 88 But it also seeks to distinguish CBS on the
ground that the order is not "self-executory and it does not command these petitioners to do or refrain from doing anything." 89
Frozen Food is not cited by the majority. "Whether," concludes
the court, an original bill in equity can be brought "is not properly before us and consequently we need not resolve the apparent
conflict in the authorities." 90 This can hardly be said to be a
sensible solution of a practical problem!
The courts of appeals have been struggling valiantly with a
comparable problem arising out of a recent amendment to the
Immigration and Nationality Act.91 This act transferred the traditional review of deportation orders from the district courts to
the courts of appeals. These courts are to review "final order[s]
of deportation." The question has arisen whether orders supplementary or incidental to such orders, e.g., a refusal to suspend an
order of deportation, is directly reviewable in the court of appeals
or must go by the old route of the district court. Is such a refusal
a "final order of deportation"? Five of the nine judges of the
Second Circuit said it is not. 92 A minority accepted the Governsame effect is Division of Prod., Am. Petroleum Institute v. Halaby, 307 F.2d 363 (5th
Cir. 1962).
80 64 Stat. 1129 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1031·42 (1958).
87 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956).
as Id. at 791.
89 Ibid.
oo Id. at 793.
01 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. III, 1961).
82 Foti v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962); accord,
Holtz v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., 309 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962). Contra, Blagaic
v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962).
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ment's argument that Congress had, in the words of a committee
report, intended " 'to create a single, separate, statutory form of
judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and
exclusion of aliens.' " 93 But the majority was unable to see its
way clear to holding that a refusal to suspend deportation was an
order to deport. It saw procedural problems in the lack of a record
that would contain everything relevant to a review; and it noted
that not even under the statutory scheme were all questions involved in such proceedings reviewable by the court of appeals.
This situation illustrates that in drafting review sections there
should be a check list of the various possible administrative actions
and a decision made as to where each type is to be reviewed. In the
absence of such an effort, my own disposition would be that of
the minority. I would strive to the greatest extent possible to consolidate review in a single court. There might be some awkwardness: the occasional lack of a record. But this is rare, arid when it
arises it can ordinarily be taken care of by affidavits or by a reference to a master or to the agency itself. It does seem to be the
solution that is currently emerging by statute or decision.
There are, however, statutes which define a reviewable order
with such limiting circumstantiality that a number of determinative agency actions cannot possibly be squared with the requirements. The National Labor Relations Act is such a statute.
Experience prior to the adoption of the act led to a restrictive
review provision. The work of the Board can be classified roughly
into proceedings to certify collective bargaining representatives
and proceedings to adjudicate unfair labor practices. The review
statute is restricted to "final orders" in the unfair labor practice
cases. In Leedom v. Kyne 94 the Supreme Court decided that certain actions taken in representation proceedings were reviewable;
review in such cases would be under the original jurisdiction of
the district courts in proceedings "arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce. . . ." 95 And there have been a few
cases arising out of unfair labor practice proceedings where, despite the absence of a final order, review has been allowed by an
93 Quoted in Foti v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., supra note 92, at 783
(majority opinion).
94 358 U.S. 184 (1958), applied in Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod,
300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), afj'd sub nom. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
95 28 u.s.c. § 1337 (1958).
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original action in the district court. The most interesting of these
is Deering Milliken, Inc. v. ]ohnston, 96 enforcing the provision of
the APA that every agency "shall proceed with reasonable dispatch. "97

VI.

CONCLUSION

An administrative action may be ripe for review despite the
fact that the full impact of the action on the plaintiff may be delayed or the fact that the disputed legal issue could receive further
consideration at a later stage of the same or a related proceeding.
Presumptively, in such circumstances it should not be reviewed.
Review is likely to interrupt and prolong the administrative proceeding. The administrative action may not yet have received as
full consideration as it will later receive, and a reviewing court
will thus lack some of the material for judgment. The relation
between the action and the plaintiff's position may not have been
brought into focus, so that the disputed legal issue may be more
"abstract" than it need be. As a consequence the question may not
be well-suited to judicial consideration. And finally, if the plaintiff were to wait, sanctions might not be invoked against him or
he may eventually win the administrative proceeding itself; thus,
the court will have been relieved of the burden of unnecessary
decision-making. On the other hand, delay may work a substantial
sacrifice of the plaintiff's protected interests, and it is this potential
loss which should be weighed against the factors supporting the
requirement of formal finality. For it should be remembered that
every one of these factors is one of degree. Early review may in
some cases be just as (or nearly as) administratively expedient,
just as informed, just as well-tailored for judicial consideration
as review at a more orthodox terminal point. Remember, too,
that it is characteristic of many administrative situations that they
are in flux. They may not present the full stops of ordinary civil
litigation; the doctrines of finality drawn from the common law
96 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). See the excellent treatment of the Deering Milliken
case in 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963). Cf. Local II2, Int'l Union Allied Industrial Workers v.
Rothman, 209 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C. 1962), ordering that the Board hear an interested
party before entering into a settlement. The Court in Deering Milliken rested its
jurisdiction on the APA § I0(e), rather than on Title 28, § 1337 of the Judicial Code.
As Judge Friendly suggests in Empresa, this enables a district court to avoid the jurisdictional limitations applicable to § 1331 of the Judicial Code. Empresa Hondurena de
Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 227 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962), afj'd sub nom. McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
97 Section 6(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
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may not only be inapplicable but even alien to the needs of the
administrative process. Where, for example, administrative regulation is concerned with creating the basic structure of an industry,
early review may have positive advantages. In any case-to repeat
-each of these factors is one of degree, as is true also of plaintiff's
hardship. This argues for a flexible approach. It argues for the
approach suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, which I shall once
more quote: "Whether 'justiciability' exists ... has most often
turned on evaluating both the appropriateness of the issues for
decision by courts and the hardship of denying judicial relief." 9s
98

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951).

